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Abstract 
This paper examines the presence of a political cycle in Australian monthly stock returns from January 1901 to 
December 2005. The period selected includes fifty-nine Liberal-National (or their antecedents) and Labor 
ministries and forty-seven elections. The political cycle is defined in terms of the party or coalition in power, 
ministerial tenure and election information effects. The market variables are defined in terms of returns, excess 
returns over inflation and excess returns over interest rates. Descriptive analysis indicates that mean returns and 
excess returns over inflation are nearly 85 percent higher and excess returns over interest rates 193 percent 
higher under Liberal-National ministries. Put differently, the market premium for Liberal-National ministries 
averages between 3.2 and 5.2 percent over comparable Labor ministries. Returns under Labor ministries are also 
characterised by extremely volatile, negatively skewed values. But after time-variation in risk is taken into 
account with a GARCH-M specification, while returns and excess returns over inflation are higher under 
Liberal-National ministries, there is no significant variation in excess returns over interest rates between 
governments. This suggests most of the variation in political risk is reflected in interest rates.      
JEL classification: G14; C12 
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1. Introduction 
Anecdotal evidence abounds of the link between securities markets and politics. In the 
financial media, most economic and social policy is scrutinised concerning possible market 
reactions, while industry and consumer groups comment on anticipated and hoped for 
changes in policy. At election time, politicians are frequently accused of pork-barrelling, with 
firms and investors alike anticipating the heady mix of tax breaks, consumption and 
production subsidies, and fiscal and monetary stimulation that accompanies changes in the 
political party in power. At the same time, parties are routinely pigeon-holed as pro- or anti-
business and pro- or anti-investor, reflected in some way in the flow and source of political 
donations. 
At least three empirical questions arise from such observations. First, does market 
behaviour differ when governments are drawn from different political parties? That is, is
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stated ideology reflected in actual policy, and does this systematically vary in its influence on 
market participants. Second, is this political influence constant or changing with the ebb and 
flow of mandated terms in office and efforts to secure re-election?  Put differently, is ideology 
of any form implemented in a different way in business and investor policy at the beginning 
of terms of an office that at the end? Finally, if the differences in markets are taken as given, 
do markets react suddenly with the announcement of elections results, or are expectations 
developed more gradually with the benefit of political comment and opinion polls?  
The purpose of this paper is to add to this intriguing body of work the results of an analysis 
of the Australian federal political cycle and its impact on the Australian equity market. To the 
author’s knowledge this is the first work of its kind in Australia. The paper itself is divided 
into five main areas. Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 provides a 
snapshot of Australian political history. Section 4 explains the data collection employed in the 
analysis and presents the empirical methodology. Section 5 presents the results. The paper 
ends with a brief conclusion. 
2.  Literature review 
The analysis of political cycles in stock market returns has been almost exclusively conducted 
in the United States, and therein the context of presidential elections. Part is generic, to the 
extent that institutional rigidities in the political cycle – mandated terms in office for example 
– impose structure upon market returns. Herbst and Slinkman (1984), for example, examined 
the period from 1926 to 1977 and found a 48-month cycle during which returns were higher 
than average, peaking in November during presidential elections. Likewise, Huang (1985) 
used data from 1832 to 1979 and discovered that stock returns were systematically higher in 
the last half of a political term than in the first, as did Hensel and Ziemba (1995), though with 
small and large-caps only. On this basis, Hensel and Ziemba (1995) suggested that “…these 
findings are consistent with the hypothesis that political re-election campaigns create policies 
that stimulate the economy and are positive for stock returns”. 
But the larger part of this research focuses on differences in political ideology and the 
differential impact of the political cycle on stock returns. Herein the focus of interest is on the 
apparent preference of the market for right-of-centre presidents (i.e. Republicans). 
Niederhoffer et al. (1970), for instance, showed that US stock market movements around 
election dates were consistent with a pro-Republican bias on Wall Street, though evidence 
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was not forthcoming on any longer-term relationship between Republican presidents and 
stock returns. Similarly, Riley and Luksetich (1980) concluded that the market prefers 
Republicans, and the market tends to rise following presidential elections. Dobson and 
Dufrene (1993) extended this analysis outside of the United States, concluding that in equity 
market terms US presidential elections invoke significant structural changes, with 
international markets becoming more highly correlated. Other studies concerning the posited 
positive market effect of Republican presidencies have been undertaken by Allvine and 
O’Neil (1980), Hobbs and Riley (1984), Foerster and Schmitz (1997), Johnson and 
Chittenden (1999), Booth and Booth (2003) and Bohl and Gottschalk (2005), while Nordhaus 
(1975), MacCrae (1977), McCallum (1978), Hibbs (1977), Beck (1982a; 1982b), Havrilesky 
(1987), Alesina and Sachs (1988) and Haynes (1989) address politico-business cycles more 
broadly.  
Most recently, Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) have re-examined the ‘presidential 
puzzle’ sometimes arising in this research: that is, real returns are higher under Democratic 
presidents, contradicting the conventional wisdom that Republicans are good for markets in a 
manner unexplained by considerations of risk. Using data since 1927, Santa-Clara and 
Valkanov (2003) found average excess returns for value-weighted market indexes over three-
month Treasury bills of about 2 percent under Republicans and 11 percent under Democrats. 
Further, a decomposition of returns revealed that the difference was due to real market returns 
being 5 percent higher under Democrats and real interest rates almost 4 percent lower. 
Responding to the question of whether the difference in average returns was due to a 
difference in expected (a Democratic risk premium) or unexpected (surprises in the economic 
policies of the party in the presidency) returns, Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) concluded 
that presidential parties capture variations in returns that are largely uncorrelated to what is 
explained by business cycle fluctuations, and hence must be associated with systematic 
differences in political policies.   
Outside of the United States, the United Kingdom and New Zealand are the only other 
national contexts known for the analysis of political cycles in stock returns. The UZ and New 
Zealand are interesting in that while these have a two-party system in common with the 
United States (Labour and Conservative, Labour and Nationals, respectively), unlike the 
United States, the prime minister (as leader of the Executive) always controls the dominant 
party in the elected house (House of Commons, House of Representatives, respectively). For 
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this reason, as in Australia, there is a clearer connection between the political ideology of the 
elected party and the implementation of economic and social policy. In New Zealand, Cahan 
et al. (2005) concluded that the presidential puzzle was reversed, and that New Zealand 
market returns were lower under left-leaning Labour governments than under National party 
governments. This lay at odds with parallel analysis that suggested that market risk was 
actually higher under the former.  
In the United Kingdom, Manning (1989) showed that British Telecom shares, though not 
the market as a whole, reacted to opinion polls surrounding the 1987 General Election in the 
face of impending nationalisation, while Peel and Pope (1983), Gwilym and Buckle (1984) 
and Thompson and Ioannidis (1987) examined the connection between the stock market and 
business support for Tory (Conservative) governments. But most recently, Hudson et al. 
(1998) found that while short-term price movements reacted to opinion polls in the run-up to 
and including elections, there was no statistically significant evidence of a difference in 
nominal or real returns between Tory and Labour governments.      
3. A snapshot of Australian political history 
Two groups conventionally dominate the Australian political spectrum at the federal level. 
The first is a conservative coalition of parties made up of the Liberal Party and the Nationals 
(including the Country Liberal Party). Collectively, these are known as the Coalition. The 
second comprises a single social democratic party, the Australian Labor Party. There have 
been fifty-nine ministries since Federation in 1901, with the Coalition and its antecedents 
accounting for thirty-eight (64 percent) and the Labor Party twenty-one (36 percent). 
Originally formed by the merger of the Protectionist and Free Trade parties in 1910, the 
Liberal Party has undergone several reformations – including as the Nationalist Party in the 
late 1910s and 1920s and the United Australian Party in the 1930s and early 1940s – 
culminating in its present-day incarnation founded by Sir Robert Menzies in 1944. The 
Liberal Party is regarded as a centre-right party and broadly represents the interests of 
business, the suburban middle classes and urbanised regions. Since the October 2004 election, 
the Liberals account for seventy-four of the one hundred and fifty House of Representatives 
seats (47 percent), and from July 2005, thirty-two of the seventy-six seats in the Senate (42 
percent). For the purposes of this analysis, the Liberal Party’s antecedents, including the 
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Protectionist, Free Trade, Tariff Reform, Nationalist Labour, Nationalist and United Australia 
parties, are viewed as ideologically similar.  
The Nationals are a conservative party that traditionally represent rural and regional 
interests. Originally known as the Country Party, and later the National Party of Australia, it 
has held seats in the federal parliament since 1919. While the party has witnessed the steady 
erosion of its rural support base in recent years, it still holds the balance of power for the 
Coalition with twelve seats in the House of Representatives (16 percent) and six in the Senate 
(8 percent). It is joined by the Country Liberal Party, which is the representative of both 
parties in the Northern Territory, holding a single seat in both the House of Representatives 
and the Senate.  
The opposing party active at the federal level is the Australian Labor Party, a centre-left 
party founded by the trade union movement in 1890 [by providing for the direct affiliation of 
trade unions, the Australian Labor Party is more like labour parties in the UK and New 
Zealand, and less like progressive parties such as the Democrats in the United States (ALP 
2006)]. Historically, support for either the Coalition or the Labor Party was viewed as class 
based, with the middle class supporting the Coalition and the working class supporting Labor. 
In recent years, this has been a less important factor: in the 1970s and 1980s Labor gained a 
significant bloc of middle class support and the Coalition enjoyed some working class 
support. Indeed, part of the current electoral success of the Coalition is attributed to its appeal 
to disaffected working class Labor voters. The Labor Party has endured a number of 
debilitating splits in its long history, most notably with Prime Minister Billy Hughes and the 
conscription debate during WWI leading to the creation of Nationalist Labor in 1917, and the 
formation of the anti-communist Democratic Labor Party in 1955. The ALP currently 
accounts for sixty seats in the House of Representatives (40 percent) and twenty-eight in the 
Senate (37 percent).  
Parties other than these have enjoyed limited success in Australia. These currently include 
the Australian Greens, a left-wing environmental party, and the Australian Democrats, 
middle-class centrists – both with four seats in the Senate – and Family First, a Christian-
influenced party appealing to social conservatives with a single Senate seat. In the past, the 
minor parties have also included the centrist Democratic Labor Party from the mid-1950s 
until the mid-1970s and the rightist One Nation party during the 1990s. The proportional 
representation system often allows minor parties to win seats in the Senate and, on occasion, 
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the balance of power in the upper house, but they have usually been unable to win seats in the 
House of Representatives (lower house) given its electorate-based preferential voting system, 
along with the nationwide dominance and broad-based appeal of the Coalition and Labor 
parties. 
4. Empirical methodology 
4.1 Data and variable specification 
Table 1 provides details of the fifty-nine Australian federal ministries since Federation on 1 
January 1901 [Federation refers to the process whereby the six self-governing colonies of 
New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania 
joined together in a federal system of government]. All information is drawn from the 
Australian Electoral Commission (2006a; 2006b). The duration of these ministries ranges 
from less than one month to eighty-two months, with the Australian Labor Party (ALP) 
accounting for 21 ministries across 389 months and the Liberal-National coalition and its 
antecedents for 38 ministries over 869 months. The starting and ending months of each 
ministerial term and the dates of the federal elections are also provided in Table 1. 
The information in Table 1 is used to define the political cycle variables in this analysis. 
The four political cycle variables are as follows. To start with, two dummy variables are 
specified that take a value of one for months the Coalition is in power and zero otherwise (Ct), 
while the second takes a value of one if the Labor Party is in power and zero otherwise (Lt). 
The next two political variables are included to take account of whether the return on equities 
varies across the term in office. Rather than using dummy variables to identify whether a day 
falls in, say, the first or second half of the period in office as in Hudson et al. (1998), a 
continuous variable (Tt) is specified as a simple linear trend taking a value of one on the first 
month in office, two on the second month, and so on. This variable is reset at the beginning of 
the next ministries’ term in office. An additional dummy variable is included which takes a 
value of one for months that include an election and zero otherwise (Et).  
The market data employed in the study are end-of-month closing prices from the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) and its predecessors over the period January 1901 to 
December 2005. This sample encompasses 1,258 months and represents the complete period 
since Federation for which monthly data is available [daily data from the ASX is also 
available, but only since 1958]. The capitalization-weighted All Ordinaries Price Index is 
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used. Currently, the index includes the top ASX-listed stocks by capitalization, covering 
about 92 percent of domestic companies by market value. To be included in the index, stocks 
must have an aggregate market value of at least 0.02 percent of all domestic equities, and 
maintain an average turnover in excess of 0.5 percent of quoted shares each month. The long-
term index includes base recalculations by Global Financial Data (2006).  
A series of monthly market returns are first calculated where ( 1ln100 − )= ttt PPR  where Pt 
is the index level at the end of month t. The market index and monthly returns for the sample 
period are presented in Figure 1 and Table 1 includes the mean return by ministry. Two 
measures of excess return are also calculated. The first represents the difference between the 
monthly market return and the monthly inflation rate as represented by the Australian 
consumer price index (Rt-It). The second is the difference between the monthly market return 
and the monthly yield on an Australian three-month Treasury bill (Rt-Yt) [Australian three-
month Treasury bills have only been issued since July 1928]. Both long-term series on 
inflation and interest rates are obtained from Global Financial Data (2006). The mean 
monthly excess return over inflation and excess return over interest by ministry are included 
in Table 1. 
4.2 Descriptive analysis 
Figure 2 plots the mean monthly return by ministry. As shown, mean monthly returns 
(ministry in brackets) are highest during Holt (35), Hawke (50) and Fraser (44) and lowest 
during Page (19), Whitlam (42) and Fraser (47). The mean returns in Table 1 range between -
2.35 and 4.75 percent. There is a similar ranking and range between returns and excess returns 
over inflation. Excess returns over interest rates, however, range between -3.23 and 4.12 
percent with the lowest mean excess returns during Fraser (47), Whitlam (42) and Page (19) 
and the highest during Fadden (23), Holt (35) and Fraser (44). 
Table 2 includes descriptive statistics by Liberal-National and Australian Labor Party for 
returns, excess returns over inflation and excess returns over interest rates. As shown, mean 
returns are higher for Liberal-National (0.5743) than Labor (0.3121), as are excess returns 
over inflation (0.5712 and 0.3080) and excess returns over interest rates (0.2075 and -0.2222). 
However, the volatility of returns (as measured by standard deviation) is higher for the Labor 
Party than Liberal-National (5.2298 and 3.2828 for returns, 5.2300 and 3.2830 for excess 
returns over inflation and 5.7046 and 3.7340 for excess returns over interest rates). This 
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would indicate that all three measures of market return are lower and more uncertain under 
Labor ministries than Liberal-National ministries. Tests for equality of means and variances 
fail to reject the null hypothesis of equality of means for Liberal-National and Labor 
governments, but do reject the null hypotheses for the equality of variances. 
By and large, the distributional properties of the nominal returns series during ministries 
also appear non-normal. Given that the sampling distribution of skewness is normal with 
mean 0 and standard deviation of T6  where T is the sample size, then returns (-2.1009), 
excess returns over inflation (-2.1015) and excess returns over interest (-2.2378) are 
significantly negatively skewed. Interestingly, the degree of skewness for Liberal-National 
ministries is always significantly less than that for Labor ministries. The kurtosis or degree of 
excess across all returns is mostly large, indicating leptokurtic distributions with many 
extreme observations for returns (29.5504), excess returns over inflation (29.5526) and excess 
returns over interest (30.2093). Given the sampling distribution of kurtosis is normal with 
mean 0 and standard deviation of T24  where T is the sample size, then all estimates are 
once again statistically significant at any conventional level. However, once again the degree 
of kurtosis for Liberal-National ministries is always less than during Labor ministries. 
Clearly, returns during Labor ministries are characterised by more volatile, extreme and 
negative values than comparable Liberal-National ministries. Finally, the Jarque-Bera 
statistics reject the null hypotheses of normality at the .01 level for all series. 
 account the time-varying variances of time series data have 
alr
4.3 Model specification 
The descriptive analysis of Australian market returns is suggestive of non-normality and 
ARCH behaviour.  A formal Lagrange multiplier test is applied and the results presented in 
Table 3. As shown, the models fail to reject the null hypothesis of no ARCH errors in favour 
of the alternative that the conditional error variance is given by an ARCH process. These 
distributional properties indicate that generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastistic 
(GARCH) models can be used to examine the dynamics of the return generation process. 
Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) models and generalised ARCH 
(GARCH) models that take into
eady been widely employed.  
The specific GARCH(p,q)-M model used is considered appropriate for several reasons.  
First, the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) establish 
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the well-known (positive) relationship between asset risk and return. At a theoretical level, 
asset risk in both CAPM and APT is measured by the conditional covariance of returns with 
the market or the conditional variance of returns. ARCH models are specifically designed to 
model and forecast conditional variances and by allowing risk to vary over time provide more 
efficient estimators and more accurate forecasts of returns than those conventionally used to 
mo
in the future and GARCH(p,q) measures this degree of 
co
d as being less homogenous and 
inf
The GARCH(p,q)-M model is described by the following: 
del conditional means.  
Second, an approach incorporating GARCH(p,q) can quantify both long and short-term 
memory in returns. While ARCH allows for a limited number of lags in deriving the 
conditional variance, and as such is considered to be a short-term memory model, GARCH 
allows all lags to exert an influence and thereby constitutes a longer-term memory model. 
This reflects an important and well-founded characteristic of asset returns in the tendency for 
volatility clustering to be found, such that large changes in returns are often followed by other 
large changes, and small changes in returns are often followed by yet more small changes. 
The implication of such volatility clustering is that volatility shocks today will influence the 
expectation of volatility many periods 
ntinuity or persistence in volatility.  
Such model assumptions are generally consistent with Australian market behaviour. 
Certainly investors are not indifferent to the volatility of the investments they hold - as 
uncertainty in return varies, so does the risk premium required by investors. In addition, these 
assumptions directly link the volatility clustering observed in markets with two pertinent 
explanations. To start with, the irregular news arrival process can at least, in part, explain 
volatility clustering, even when the market incorporates such information perfectly and 
immediately. At the macro level nominal interest rates, business cycles, industrial production 
and other indicators have already been proposed as sources of this clustering. However, it is 
also the case that if market participants have heterogenous beliefs and there are lags in the 
absorption of information, volatility clustering may also occur. This appears especially likely 
in political markets since they are conventionally regarde
ormationally efficient than their financial counterparts.   
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where the variables in the mean equation (1) are as follows: rs,t is the market return at time t 
(where s = Rt, Rt-It and Rt-Yt), xs,k are the set of k political factors expected to influence rs,t 
(where x = Ct, Lt, Tt and Et), hs,t measures the return volatility or risk of the market portfolio s 
at time t, and εs,t is the error term which is normally distributed with zero mean and a variance 
of hs,t, as described by the distribution in (3). The sensitivity of the market portfolio s at t to 
the political factors is measured by the n parameters of αs,k.   
The conditional variance hs,t follows the process described in (2) and for the sth market 
portfolio is determined by the past squared error terms (ε2t-1) and past behaviour of the 
variance (ht-1), βs,0 is the time-invariant component of risk for the sth market portfolio, βs,  are 
the ARCH parameter(s) and γs,j are the GARCH parameter(s). Heteroskedasticity consistent 
covariance matrices are estimated following Bollerslev and Wooldridge.   
5.  Empirical results 
The estimated coefficients and standard errors for the conditional mean return and variance 
equations are presented in Table 2. Different GARCH-M(p,q) models were initially fitted to 
the data and compared on the basis of the Akaike and Schwarz Information Criteria (results 
not shown) from which a GARCH(1,1) model was deemed most appropriate for modelling 
the monthly return process for the market returns. Nonetheless, this particular specification 
has generally been shown to be a parsimonious representation of conditional variance that 
adequately fits most financial time series. 
The estimated coefficients and standard errors of the GARCH-M(1,1) parameters are 
presented in Table 3. Nine separate models with three different independent variables across 
three different sample periods are estimated: returns (columns 4, 5 and 6) (Rt), excess returns 
over inflation (columns 7, 8 and 9) (Rt-It) and excess returns over interest rates (columns 10, 
11 and 12) (Rt-Yt) and the full sample from January 1901 to December 2005 (uppermost 
panel), another from January 1901 to December 1949 (middle panel) and a further from 
January 1950 to December 2005 (lower panel). The breakpoint for splitting the sample is 
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somewhat arbitrary, but does divide the sample into two fairly equal periods, and takes 
allowance of the post-war shift from the Labor Party to the more than twenty year dominance 
of the Liberal-Nationals. The independent variables for the nine models are common. The 
independent variables are dummy variables for Liberal-National (Ct) and Labor (Lt) 
governments, a political term trend (Tt), and dummy variables for election months (Et).  
The political cycle hypotheses are tested as follows. As a rule, the market return for 
Coalition governments is expected to be higher than the market return for Labor governments. 
Moreover, it is hypothesised that returns vary within a given ministerial term, such that 
returns may increase or decline during the term of office. Further, it is hypothesised that 
returns in a month when an election is held may be higher or lower than returns during the 
same political term, but the direction may be dependent upon whether the election comprises 
a shock. Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003: 1863), for example, argued that “…if the observed 
difference in returns is due to a difference in expected returns, the change in the level of the 
market at the time that the information is revealed should be quite large”. Two hypotheses are 
tested. The first is a test of the joint hypothesis that all four political parameters are significant 
in influencing market returns (HN: α1 + α2 + α3 + α4 = 0; HA: α1 + α2 + α3 + α4 ≠ 0) the second 
is that the estimated coefficient on Liberal (including the Nationals) is equal to the estimated 
coefficient for the Labor Party (HN: α1 = α2; HA: α1 > α2). If the first null hypothesis is 
rejected, then market returns exhibit a form of political cycle, related to either the party in 
power and/or the tenure of power and/or election effects. If the second is rejected, then the 
parties have a differential impact upon market returns.  
All of the models in Table 3 are highly significant, with tests rejecting the null hypotheses 
of joint insignificance of the four political cycle variables at the .01 level. The coefficient on 
Liberal-National is always positive and higher than Labor, with the exception of returns and 
excess returns over inflation for the period January 1950 to December 2005, and significant at 
the .10 level or lower, with the exception of excess returns over interest in the period up to 
December 1949. The coefficient on Labor is also mostly significant, with the exception of 
excess returns over interest for the period 1901-2005, excess returns over inflation and excess 
returns over interest up until 1949 and excess returns over interest since 1950. However, only 
in the case of returns and excess returns over inflation for the entire sample period and for the 
period until 1949 does a Wald test reject the null hypothesis of equality for the Liberal-
National and Labor coefficients in favour of the alternative hypothesis that the coefficient for 
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Liberal-National is greater than that for Labor. For the remaining coefficients, the coefficient 
for the term in office is always negative, but never significant, while the coefficient for 
election months is always positive and significant, indicating that returns are higher during 
months in which an election is held. Finally, while the relationship between return and 
volatility in models like this is far from clear empirically, in none of the models is the 
variance term in the mean equation significantly negative.  
6. Concluding remarks 
The present study employs a number of different procedures to test for a political cycle in the 
Australian stock market since Federation in January 1901. A comparison of mean returns 
provides some evidence to support the conjecture that returns, excess returns over inflation 
and excess returns over interest rates depend upon the political affiliation of the ministry in 
power: more specifically, throughout Australian political history, market returns, however 
defined, are generally higher under Liberal-National ministries than Labor ministries. 
Moreover, there is strong evidence that the returns under Liberal-National ministries are more 
normally distributed than returns under Labor ministries which are characterised by volatile, 
extreme, and mostly negative, values. Such risk differences potentially arise from the 
different parties’ economic and social policies, uncertainty among investors about these 
policies, or doubt among voters concerning future election outcomes. 
Modelling the political cycle using ARCH techniques is also suggestive of higher returns 
under Liberal-National than Labor ministries. For returns and excess returns over inflation, 
the returns for Liberal-National ministries are higher than Labor ministries for the full sample 
and for the period before December 1949, however, the evidence concerning a premium for 
Liberal-National ministries in terms of excess returns over interest rates is less significant. 
This indicates that much of the difference between different political parties is tied up with 
macroeconomic factors such as interest rates, and reflects opinion that political risk is mostly 
reflected in these rather than stock returns. Moreover, the estimated coefficients for the Labor 
party are higher in the period since 1950 (though not significantly), suggesting that any pro- 
or anti-bias by business and/or investors has lessened in more recent decades.  
Of course, this study does suffer a number of limitations, all of which suggest future 
avenues for research. First, it has not been possible to distinguish between small and large 
caps in the Australian market. Hensel and Ziemba (1995), for example, identified that while 
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the returns of large caps were identical under different administrations in the US, a significant 
small cap effect existed under Democratic presidencies. Unfortunately, the use of a value-
weighted index in the present analysis (and the unavailability of an equivalent equally-
weighted index) infers the most direct focus is on large caps. Second, the monthly sampling 
frequency employed in this study means that many interesting aspects of the political cycle 
could not be full addressed. Though daily data is only available since January 1958, more 
frequent sampling would nevertheless allow attention to be given to the information effects of 
elections and election outcomes in the spirit of an event study [see, for instance, Santa-Clara 
and Valkanov (2003)].      
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Table 1 Australian ministries and monthly market returns, January 1901 to December 2005 
No. Ministry by prime minister
Party or 
coalition 
Start  
date 
 
End  
date 
Term 
in 
office
Return 
Excess 
return 
inflation
Excess 
return 
interest
No. Ministry by prime minister
Party or 
coalition
Start  
date 
End  
date 
Term 
in 
office
Return 
Excess 
return 
inflation
Excess 
return 
interest 
1 Barton P Jan 1901 Sep 1903 33 0.1648 0.1636 – 31 Menzies L-CP Jan 1956 Dec 1958 23 0.9110 0.9094 0.8277 
2 Deakin P Sep 1903 Apr 1904 7 1.3060 1.3094 – 32 Menzies L-CP Dec 1958 Dec 1963 61 0.8166 0.8153 0.5531 
3 Watson ALP Apr 1904 Aug 1904 4 1.1946 1.1991 – 33 Menzies L-CP Dec 1963 Jan 1966 25 -0.4123 -0.4148 -0.7389 
4 Reid-McLean FT-P Aug 1904 Jul 1905 10 0.5907 0.5901 – 34 Holt L-CP Jan 1966 Dec 1966 10 -0.3654 -0.3680 -0.7471 
5 Deakin P Jul 1905 Nov 1908 40 0.6270 0.6253 – 35 Holt L-CP Dec 1966 Dec 1967 12 2.8128 2.8105 2.4395 
6 Fisher ALP Nov 1908 Jun 1909 7 0.4449 0.4435 – 36 McEwen L-CP Dec 1967 Jan 1968 1 1.0697 1.0667 0.6947 
7 Deakin P-FT-TR Jun 1909 Apr 1910 11 0.6518 0.6512 – 37 Gorton L-CP Jan 1968 Feb 1968 2 1.2247 1.2241 0.8497 
8 Fisher ALP Apr 1910 Jun 1913 38 0.2678 0.2636 – 38 Gorton L-CP Feb 1968 Nov 1969 20 1.2455 1.2426 0.8634 
9 Cook L Jun 1913 Sep 1914 15 0.2017 0.1967 – 39 Gorton L-CP Nov 1969 Mar 1971 16 -1.1646 -1.1687 -1.6097 
10 Fisher ALP Sep 1914 Oct 1915 13 0.0708 0.0580 – 40 McMahon L-CP Mar 1971 Dec 1972 21 1.0240 1.0191 0.6208 
11 Hughes ALP Oct 1915 Nov 1916 12 -0.9614 -0.9590 – 41 Whitlam ALP Dec 1972 Dec 1972 1 0.1340 0.1305 -0.1868 
12 Hughes NL Nov 1916 Feb 1917 4 -0.0764 -0.0743 – 42 Whitlam ALP Dec 1972 Jun 1974 17 -2.1957 -2.2062 -2.7069 
13 Hughes N Feb 1917 Jan 1918 10 0.7861 0.7835 – 43 Whitlam ALP Jun 1974 Nov 1975 17 -0.1934 -0.2051 -0.9147 
14 Hughes N Jan 1918 Feb 1923 61 0.7374 0.7343 – 44 Fraser L-CP Nov 1975 Dec 1975 2 4.7483 4.7294 4.1233 
15 Bruce-Page N-CP Feb 1923 Oct 1929 81 0.5748 0.5739 -0.3064 45 Fraser L-CP Dec 1975 Dec 1977 24 0.3083 0.2989 -0.3599 
16 Scullin ALP Oct 1929 Jan 1932 26 -1.4572 -1.4500 -1.8972 46 Fraser L-CP Dec 1977 Nov 1980 34 2.4109 2.4036 1.6484 
17 Lyons UAP Jan 1932 Nov 1938 82 0.8421 0.8413 0.6512 47 Fraser L-CP Nov 1980 May 1982 18 -2.0766 -2.0848 -3.2398 
18 Lyons UAP Nov 1938 Apr 1939 5 -0.6098 -0.6129 -0.7556 48 Fraser L-CP May 1982 Mar 1983 10 -0.0958 -0.1052 -1.2049 
19 Page CP-UAP Apr 1939 Apr 1939 1 -2.3546 -2.3542 -2.5004 49 Hawke ALP Mar 1983 Dec 1984 21 1.9400 1.9357 1.0421 
20 Menzies UAP Apr 1939 Mar 1940 10 0.7158 0.7147 0.5700 50 Hawke ALP Dec 1984 Jul 1987 32 3.1143 3.1075 1.8613 
21 Menzies UAP Mar 1940 Oct 1940 8 -0.6397 -0.6449 -0.7673 51 Hawke ALP Jul 1987 Apr 1990 32 -0.8725 -0.8787 -2.0415 
22 Menzies UAP Oct 1940 Aug 1941 10 -0.0031 -0.0071 -0.1282 52 Hawke ALP Apr 1990 Dec 1991 21 0.3457 0.3426 -0.6141 
23 Fadden CP-UAP Aug 1941 Oct 1941 1 2.4532 2.4501 2.3282 53 Keating ALP Dec 1991 Dec 1991 1 -1.7532 -1.7532 -2.3782 
24 Curtin ALP Oct 1941 Sep 1943 24 0.1583 0.1534 0.0333 54 Keating ALP Dec 1991 Mar 1993 14 0.1941 0.1932 -0.3048 
25 Curtin ALP Sep 1943 Jul 1945 21 0.2633 0.2634 0.1620 55 Keating ALP Mar 1993 Mar 1996 35 0.9065 0.9040 0.3863 
26 Forde ALP Jul 1945 Jul 1945 1 -0.1958 -0.1985 -0.2791 56 Howard L-NPA Mar 1996 Oct 1998 32 0.4531 0.4524 -0.0158 
27 Chifley ALP Jul 1945 Nov 1946 15 0.9726 0.9678 0.8893 57 Howard L-NPA Oct 1998 Nov 2001 37 0.5766 0.5738 0.1459 
28 Chifley ALP Nov 1946 Dec 1949 38 0.4341 0.4275 0.3551 58 Howard L-NPA Nov 2001 Oct 2004 35 0.4128 0.4108 0.0045 
29 Menzies L-CP Dec 1949 May 1951 16 2.0631 2.0518 2.0006 59 Howard L-NS Oct 2004 – – 14 1.5575 1.5551 1.0985 
30 Menzies L-CP May 1951 Jan 1956 68 -0.1591 -0.1649 -0.2382 All Various Various Jan 1901 Dec 2005 1260 0.4931 0.4898 0.0615 
Source: Australian Electoral Commission (2006a; 2006b). Notes: Return – monthly percentage return, Excess return over inflation – monthly excess percentage return over 
monthly inflation, Excess return over interest – monthly excess percentage return over monthly 3-month T-bill yield (since 1928 only). Term in office is in months. The 
Australian Parliament consists of two houses, the Senate – selected by voters within a state - and the House of Representatives – selected by voters within an electorate. The 
party or coalition of parties that has a majority in the House of Representatives forms the Government. In most cases, new governments are formed after general elections, but 
could also be formed if the majority party changes its leader, loses its majority (e.g. as a result of a by-election), or is defeated in an important vote. House of Representative 
elections were held in Dec 1903, Dec 1906, Apr 1910, May 1913, Sep 1914, May 1917, Dec 1919, Jan 1922, Feb 1922, Nov 1925, Dec 1925, Nov 1928, Dec 1928, Oct 1929, 
Dec 1929, Dec 1931, Sep 1934, Sep 1934, Oct 1937, Oct 1937, Sep 1940, Aug 1943, Sep 1946, Dec 1949, Apr 1951, May 1954, Dec 1955, Nov 1958, Dec 1961, Nov 1963, 
Nov 1966, Oct 1969, Dec 1972, May 1974, Dec 1975, Dec 1977, Oct 1980, Mar 1983, Dec 1984, Jul 1987, Mar 1990, Mar 1993, Mar 1996, Oct 1998, Nov 2001 and Oct 2004. 
Protectionist (P), Australian Labor Party (ALP), Free Trade (FT), Tariff Reform (TR), Nationalist Labour (NL), Nationalist (N), Country Party (CP), United Australia Party 
(UAP), Liberal Party (L), National Party of Australia (NPA), Nationals (NS). The starting (ending) date for each ministry is to the nearest non-overlapping month, i.e. if the 
previous ministry ended on 23 October (day-of-month not shown in table) that ministry ends in October and the following ministry starts in November.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Monthly market index and returns, January 1901 to December 2005 
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Notes: Returns only. Sample period January 1901 to December 2005. Figures show the end-of-month value of the index 
(left-hand side axis) and monthly returns (right-hand side axis). 
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Notes: Returns only. The numerical identifier for each ministry corresponds to Table 1. Australian Labor Party (ALP) ministries are shown in 
white. Protectionist (P), Free Trade (FT), Tariff Reform (TR), Nationalist Labour (NL), Nationalist (N), Country Party (CP), United Australia 
Party (UAP), Liberal Party, National Party of Australia (NPA) and Nationals (NS) ministries are included in the non-ALP category. The term in 
office varies by ministry.    
Figure 2 
Mean monthly returns by ministry, January 1901 to December 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2  
Comparison of monthly returns by party and 
coalition, January 1901 to December 2005 
 Statistic 
All parties 
and 
coalitions 
Liberal-
National 
(Ct) 
Australian 
Labor Party
(Lt) 
 Number 1258 869 389
 Mean 0.4950 0.5743 0.3121
 Median 0.5632 0.6646 0.2550
 Maximum 20.1057 16.7232 20.1057
 Minimum -55.2449 -14.8877 -55.2449
 Std. Dev. 4.4896 3.2828 5.2298
 Skewness -2.1009 -0.1200 -3.0428
 Kurtosis 29.5504 6.7279 35.7443
 Jarque-Bera 2.80E+04 5.06E+02 1.80E+04
R
et
ur
ns
 (R
t) 
 Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 Number 1258 869 389
 Mean 0.4913 0.5712 0.3080
 Median 0.5622 0.6653 0.2469
 Maximum 20.1192 16.7157 20.1192
 Minimum -55.2511 -14.8951 -55.2511
 Std. Dev. 4.4897 3.2830 5.2300
 Skewness -2.1015 -0.1212 -3.0432
 Kurtosis 29.5526 6.7274 35.7463
 Jarque-Bera 2.80E+04 5.06E+02 1.80E+04
Ex
ce
ss
 re
tu
rn
 (R
t-I
t) 
 Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 Number 928 613 315
 Mean 0.0615 0.2075 -0.2222
 Median 0.2361 0.3818 0.0593
 Maximum 19.6161 16.2999 19.6161
 Minimum -56.1932 -15.7577 -56.1932
 Std. Dev. 4.5029 3.7340 5.7046
 Skewness -2.2378 -0.2499 -3.0274
 Kurtosis 30.2093 5.6153 32.0431
 Jarque-Bera 2.95E+04 1.81E+02 1.16E+04
Ex
ce
ss
 re
tu
rn
 (R
t-Y
t) 
 Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: Liberal-National includes all antecedent parties. 
Return – monthly percentage return, excess return over 
inflation – monthly excess percentage return over 
monthly inflation, excess return over interest – monthly 
excess percentage return over monthly 3-month T-bill 
yield (since 1928 only). Levene’s test of equality of 
variances by category (Liberal-National and Australian 
Labor Party) is rejected for returns (statistic = 25.27, p-
value = 0.00), excess returns over inflation (statistic = 
25.30, p-value = 0.00) and excess returns over interest 
(statistic = 13.54, p-value = 0.00). A t-test for equality of 
means by category fails to be rejected for returns 
(statistic = 1.09, p-value = 0.28), excess returns over 
inflation (statistic = 1.08, p-value = 0.27) and excess 
returns over interest (statistic = 1.37, p-value = 0.16). 
The critical value for significance of at least 315 
observations is 0.138 for skewness and 0.270 for 
kurtosis.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3  
Estimated coefficients and standard errors of political cycle models  
   Returns (Rt) Excess returns over inflation (Rt-It) Excess returns over interest (Rt-Yt)
  Parameter Coefficient Std. error p-value Coefficient Std. error p-value Coefficient Std. error p-value 
γ 0.0042 0.0082 0.6148 0.0041 0.0082 0.6197 -0.0039 0.0092 0.6749
α1 0.6130 0.1304 0.0000 0.6111 0.1304 0.0000 0.6143 0.1872 0.0010
α2 0.3592 0.1507 0.0172 0.3569 0.1508 0.0179 0.3578 0.2229 0.1084
α3 -0.0003 0.0034 0.9405 -0.0002 0.0034 0.9444 -0.0064 0.0044 0.1408
M
ea
n 
 
eq
ua
tio
n 
α4 0.4871 0.2923 0.0956 0.4865 0.2921 0.0958 0.9381 0.4350 0.0311
β0 0.1744 0.0626 0.0053 0.1745 0.0626 0.0053 0.3143 0.1170 0.0072
β1 0.2014 0.0310 0.0000 0.2016 0.0310 0.0000 0.2373 0.0407 0.0000
V
ar
ia
nc
e 
eq
ua
tio
n 
γ 0.8148 0.0232 0.0000 0.8147 0.0232 0.0000 0.7864 0.0285 0.0000
ARCH-LM 1.0800 – 0.3719 1.0792 – 0.3727 0.5091 – 0.9080
α1+α2..= 0 52.4846 – 0.0000 52.4846 – 0.0000 17.7348 – 0.0014Jan
ua
ry
 1
90
1-
D
ec
em
be
r 2
00
5 
Te
st
 
st
at
is
tic
s 
α1 = α2 2.7735 – 0.0479 2.7803 – 0.0477 1.3701 – 0.1210
γ -0.0044 0.0203 0.8267 -0.0044 0.0203 0.8273 0.0027 0.0134 0.8384
α1 0.5758 0.1568 0.0002 0.5739 0.1568 0.0003 0.4060 0.2983 0.1736
α2 0.3215 0.1659 0.0526 0.3192 0.1660 0.0545 0.2095 0.1709 0.2202
α3 0.0013 0.0036 0.7107 0.0014 0.0036 0.7075 -0.0052 0.0051 0.2998
M
ea
n 
 
eq
ua
tio
n 
α4 0.0470 0.3163 0.8819 0.0462 0.3160 0.8838 0.6334 0.4622 0.1706
β0 0.3460 0.1366 0.0113 0.3457 0.1365 0.0113 0.1604 0.1127 0.1548
β1 0.2508 0.0627 0.0001 0.2504 0.0627 0.0001 0.5702 0.2091 0.0064
V
ar
ia
nc
e 
eq
ua
tio
n 
γ 0.7295 0.0564 0.0000 0.7298 0.0564 0.0000 0.6461 0.0711 0.0000
ARCH-LM 14.6585 – 0.0000 14.5848 – 0.0000 7.8594 – 0.0000
α1+α2..= 0 24.5405 – 0.0000 24.3881 – 0.0000 5.1960 – 0.2678Jan
ua
ry
 1
90
1-
D
ec
em
be
r 1
94
9 
Te
st
 
st
at
is
tic
s 
α1 = α2 2.3806 – 0.0614 2.3893 – 0.0611 0.5000 – 0.2397
γ -0.0042 0.0146 0.7743 -0.0042 0.0146 0.7714 -0.0097 0.0147 0.5087
α1 0.8774 0.2964 0.0031 0.8748 0.2964 0.0032 0.5696 0.3004 0.0580
α2 1.1855 0.5047 0.0188 1.1831 0.5046 0.0190 0.5044 0.5084 0.3211
α3 -0.0064 0.0090 0.4744 -0.0064 0.0090 0.4759 -0.0032 0.0090 0.7173
M
ea
n 
 
eq
ua
tio
n 
α4 1.5772 0.9041 0.0811 1.5758 0.9044 0.0815 1.5959 0.9175 0.0820
β0 0.6328 0.2810 0.0243 0.6350 0.2818 0.0242 0.5440 0.2537 0.0320
β1 0.1471 0.0357 0.0000 0.1474 0.0358 0.0000 0.1271 0.0321 0.0001
V
ar
ia
nc
e 
eq
ua
tio
n 
γ 0.8335 0.0334 0.0000 0.8332 0.0335 0.0000 0.8547 0.0313 0.0000
ARCH-LM 0.2988 – 0.9896 0.2988 – 0.9896 0.2806 – 0.9918
α1+α2..= 0 20.0769 – 0.0005 19.9977 – 0.0005 12.1594 – 0.0162Jan
ua
ry
 1
95
0-
D
ec
em
be
r 2
00
5 
Te
st
 
st
at
is
tic
s 
α1 = α2 -0.5981 – 0.2196 -0.5991 – 0.2195 0.0265 – 0.4353
Notes: Dependent variables are returns, excess returns over inflation and excess returns over interest. The GARCH-M models 
presented include the conditional variance in the mean equation along with dummy variables for Liberal and Labor ministries, a 
ministerial political cycle trend variable and a dummy variable for election months. The variance equation includes a constant, a 
first-order autoregressive GARCH term and a first-order moving average ARCH term. ARCH test – Lagrange multiplier test of 
null hypothesis of no ARCH errors versus the alternative hypothesis that the conditional error variance is given by an ARCH(12) 
process from a preliminary least squares regression.  
 
 
